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Sounds of Prejudice: Background Music During 
Victim Impact Statements* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Music has the ability to bring up past memories, to transport us to 
another place and time.  Each specific song has its own unique 
connotation: “Pomp and Circumstance” with graduation,1 “Amazing 
Grace” with funerals,2 “Here Comes the Bride” with weddings,3 and 
“Stayin’ Alive” with John Travolta and disco.4  Even music we have 
never heard before has an effect on us and can change the mood of our 
current surroundings.  It tells us when to feel anxious during scary 
movies; in happier ones, it lets us know when the guy is about to get the 
girl. 
Music’s powerful effect on emotion makes it a dangerous addition to 
the supposedly logic-and-reason-based setting of a courtroom.  This 
added emotion makes it even more difficult for jurors to set aside their 
feelings and make rational decisions.  Yet, numerous courts have 
somehow allowed music to be played at a time when emotional decisions 
can be very dangerous to a defendant: during his sentencing. 
Imagine the jurors trying to determine a sentence, after already 
convicting a defendant for murder, listening to the grief-stricken family 
of the victim describe how the crime has changed their lives.  And at the 
conclusion of the already highly emotional testimony, the prosecutor 
presents a picture montage of the victim’s entire life, while Celine Dion’s 
“My Heart Will Go On” plays in the background.5  The court then 
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 1. EDWARD ELGAR, Pomp and Circumstance March No. 1, on MARCHES GREATEST HITS 
(Sony 1994). 
 2. JOHN NEWTON, Amazing Grace, on OLNEY HYMNS (Newton 1779). 
 3. RICHARD WAGNER, Bridal Chorus, on THE BEST OF WAGNER (RCA 1991). 
 4. BEE GEES, Stayin’ Alive, on SATURDAY NIGHT FEVER (RSO 1977). 
 5. CELINE DION, My Heart Will Go On, on TITANIC: MUSIC FROM THE MOTION PICTURE 
(Epic 1997). 
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instructs the jurors to weigh the facts and make an informed and rational 
decision, a difficult request in any sentencing, but made even more 
impossible after the music unnecessarily stirred up additional emotion. 
Several courts have allowed prosecutors to present videos with 
background music exactly as described in the above scenario.  At a 
sentencing hearing, prosecutors may present evidence in the form of 
victim impact statements (VIS) to inform the jury of the harm caused by 
the defendant.  Such statements play an important part in the judicial 
process, but there needs to be a limit to what VIS can entail. 
The current trend of advancing technology has made the use of 
electronic media during VIS a widespread phenomenon.  In addition to 
live testimony from family, more prosecutors today are using 
technology, such as PowerPoint presentations or videos, to visually 
present the lives of deceased victims.  Many of these presentations are 
set to emotional background music—an irrelevant and highly prejudicial 
addition to otherwise admissible VIS.  Allowing such music during VIS 
causes prejudicial emotional decisions resulting in a fundamentally 
unfair sentencing, and courts should no longer allow music during VIS. 
Those courts deciding on the admissibility of musical VIS have not 
uniformly agreed upon its admission, and the current standard of 
admissibility set out by the Supreme Court is not consistently applied.  A 
closer look at the scientific evidence demonstrating music’s prejudicial 
impact on emotion and decision-making shows that allowing music 
during VIS creates a high risk that jurors will make decisions based on 
emotion instead of reason.  This risk cannot be tolerated, especially when 
there is no way to determine whether inappropriate factors influenced the 
sentence. 
This comment will discuss the prejudicial impact of allowing 
emotional music during VIS, focusing primarily on the admission of 
such music during capital sentencing by juries.  Part II explains music’s 
proven effect on emotion and provides an overview of the background of 
VIS in general, including the case history and current standards for 
allowing VIS.  Part III analyzes the inconsistency of courts’ attempts to 
apply the current standard of admissibility for VIS involving music.  Part 
III also includes a discussion of emotion’s prejudicial effect on decision-
making and provides an overview of why music should be inadmissible 
during VIS.  Part IV concludes the discussion with a suggestion that 
courts universally ban music during VIS. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the danger of allowing music during VIS, it is 
necessary to understand music’s proven ability to influence emotion.  
The history and function of VIS are also relevant to why courts have 
allowed music at all. 
A. Music’s Prejudicial Effect on Emotion 
Music has the power to produce varying physical responses of which 
we are aware, such as tears and goose bumps; it may also cause less-
noticeable physical reactions including decreased blood pressure, 
reduced stress, hormone suppression, and muscle relaxation.6  But one of 
music’s best-known results is its effect on emotion.  It is common 
knowledge that music adds to visual effects—a movie just would not be 
the same with dialogue alone.  But what is it about music that causes 
such an emotional response? 
There are two widespread theories regarding music’s effect on 
emotion: (1) the expression theory, which assumes music itself expresses 
emotion that is simply recognized by the listener; and (2) the arousal 
theory, which speculates that music brings out or even generates emotion 
in the listener.7 
The expression theory argues that how a listener experiences music 
is somewhat similar to how one interprets body language, facial 
expressions, or gestures.8  Throughout our lives, we become “experts” in 
observing and can readily match non-verbal cues with previously formed 
subconscious beliefs.9  Thus, depending on what non-verbal cues a 
speaker is sending, a pleasant message may be received as angry or 
unkind.  Similarly, sad or sorrowful music can bring an unhappy mood 
into an otherwise enjoyable experience.10 
The arousal theory, on the other hand, maintains that music itself has 
the power to elicit emotion in the listener.  Klaus Scherer and Marcel 
Zentner propose that emotions can be created by musical stimuli in three 
                                                     
 6. See Klaus R. Scherer & Marcel R. Zentner, Emotional Effects of Music: Production Rules, 
in MUSIC AND EMOTION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 361, 374 (P.N. Juslin & J.A. Sloboda eds., 2001). 
 7. Iben Have, Background Music and Background Feelings: Background Music in Audio-
Visual Media, 6 J. MUSIC & MEANING § 5, 5.4 (2008). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. (stating that we are “experts in observing and creating meaning from other people’s 
gestures”). 
 10. See id. (stating that background music that is gentle can alter one’s experience of a visually 
and verbally unsympathetic person). 
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ways: through appraisal, memory, or empathy.11  When emotions are 
created through appraisal of music, our bodies automatically process and 
evaluate the music against personal criteria to decide whether it is 
cheerful or sorrowful.12  Additionally, memories can bring back past 
emotions when an individual has a reaction to a specific song or sound.13 
The third way emotions may be created through music is by 
empathy, or through the phenomenon of feeling emotions based on 
observing.14  Listening to expressive music is similar to observing others’ 
emotions and, as such, can lead to the generation of a similar emotion in 
the observer.15  This possibility that music can create empathy is 
especially concerning when music is introduced into the already highly 
emotional setting of VIS.  Any information jurors receive from VIS 
should be based on the words of the victim’s family.  Not only is it unfair 
to add accompanying mournful music that will generate further empathy, 
but it creates a grave danger of emotional decisions by the jury. 
Of course, the specific emotional reaction will depend upon the type 
of music.  Studies have shown that music can be reliably described using 
basic emotional expressions such as happy, sad, or fearful.16  Although 
the music’s performance may be a factor, the listener’s interpretation 
may be influenced even more by culture, personality, experience, 
musical expertise, specific memories, or mood.17  Additionally, 
contextual aspects of the location and event where the music is played 
affect the listener, not only for acoustic purposes, but as a result of the 
surrounding atmosphere—which could be anything from a funeral to a 
holiday party.18  In short, Scherer and Zentner determined that emotions 
actually experienced by a listener can be determined by a formula 
consisting of all the aforementioned factors: the melody itself, the 
manner of performance, the personality and experiences of the listener, 
and the location or event where the music is heard.19  Because not every  
 
                                                     
 11. Scherer & Zentner, supra note 6, at 366–71. 
 12. See id. at 366 (discussing the process of evaluating an event). 
 13. Id. at 369. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 369–71. 
 16. Carol L. Krumhansl, Music: A Link Between Cognition and Emotion, 11 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 45, 46 (2002). 
 17. Scherer & Zentner, supra note 6, at 364. 
 18. Id. at 364–65. 
 19. See id. at 365.  The formula in more scientific detail is written as: “Experienced emotion = 
Structural features [melody, tempo, rhythm, and harmony] x Performance features [performer 
identity, ability, and state] x Listener features [culture, personality, expertise, mood, and memories] 
x Contextual features [location and event].”  Id. 
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condition will be present at all times, the different factors will carry 
different weight depending on the individual listener.20 
Not only have studies identified factors of music that affect emotion, 
more importantly, some have actually shown how music affects a 
listener’s emotions.  Although opponents argue and have shown that 
emotions can arise through an individual’s personal connection with 
specific tones, it is apparent that music must actually produce emotion—
otherwise emotions from the same music would vary from person to 
person depending on his or her past experiences.21  This, however, is not 
the case, as different people with different experiences have similar 
emotions upon hearing the same song.  In fact, studies using brain-
imaging techniques have proven that music causes an involuntary 
reaction in us all, even in those incapable of producing memories.22 
Several studies have focused on background music’s influential 
effect on a listener.  For example, a study based on five- and six-year-
olds by Naomi Ziv and Maya Goshen in 2006 found that background 
music influenced interpretation of a neutral story as either happy or sad.23  
Children hearing happy background music (in a major key) recalled 
specific neutral events from the story as happy and regarded the story as 
happy in general.24  Although the results were somewhat less noticeable, 
children listening to sad background music (in a minor key) interpreted 
the same events from the story as sad.25  Based on these results, it is 
conceivable that jurors who view pictures in a montage or listen to a 
family member speak while listening to sad or sentimental music will 
interpret those pictures differently than jurors who hear no music at all.  
And as the next study will show, the emotional impact of such music is 
magnified when the pictures or words themselves have a sad 
connotation. 
Because music coupled with neutral experiences can create emotions 
based on the feelings given by the music, it is not surprising that music 
heard during experiences that are by themselves either positive or 
negative can strengthen those feelings even more.  Music attached to an 
emotional narrative can shape feelings based on the type of narrative, the 
                                                     
 20. Id. 
 21. Krumhansl, supra note 16, at 45. 
 22. See id. at 49 (discussing results of studies using infants and individuals suffering from brain 
damage). 
 23. Naomi Ziv & Maya Goshen, The Effect of ‘Sad’ and ‘Happy’ Background Music on the 
Interpretation of a Story in 5 to 6-Year-Old Children, 23 BRIT. J. MUSIC. EDUC. 303, 311 (2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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circumstances surrounding the communication, the listener’s ability to 
empathize, and any other messages in the music from the sender.26  Thus, 
when sad music is played during a mournful narrative in the somber 
atmosphere of a sentencing hearing, the jury’s initial emotions will be 
greatly and unnecessarily intensified. 
When music is coupled with visual stimuli, such as pictures, the 
influence on emotion is even more prominent.  Everyday experiences 
with music in films and television has taught us to quickly extract 
meaning from accompanying music—it is easy to tell when to be happy 
and when to be sad.  This interpretation happens subconsciously, similar 
to how one recognizes body language.27  One study using brain scan 
technology showed that emotional pictures alone can evoke emotion, but 
combining emotional pictures with emotional music heightens the 
experience, “automatically evok[ing] (strong) emotional feelings and 
experiences.”28  Because of this automatic response, it is impossible to 
ask jurors simply to ignore prejudicial background music.  The only 
option is to ban it from VIS altogether. 
These studies have clearly shown that music can both cause and 
strengthen emotion in its listeners.  Under either theory, the result is 
clear: music has an impact on emotion.  This emotion, in turn, has a 
highly prejudicial effect on a jury’s supposedly neutral decision.  To 
fully appreciate this impact, it is important to understand the background 
and current state of law regarding VIS admission. 
B. Victim Impact Statements in General 
VIS are defined as “statement[s] read into the record during 
sentencing to inform the judge or jury of the financial, physical, and 
psychological impact of the crime on the victim and the victim’s 
family.”29  VIS may vary from one jurisdiction to another, but a typical 
statement may accomplish one or more tasks: (1) identifying the victim, 
(2) itemizing economic loss, (3) identifying the seriousness and 
permanence of physical injury, (4) describing changes in the victim’s 
                                                     
 26. Have, supra note 7, at § 5.5.  Of course, the expression and arousal theories still apply and 
there may be differences between what a listener thinks the speaker is feeling and what the listener 
himself is feeling.  This difference will depend on the listener’s attention and empathetic abilities.  
See id.  A listener’s feelings will not necessarily match the subjective feelings of the narrative: one 
may feel pity when hearing of another’s sorrow. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Thomas Baumgartner et al., The Emotional Power of Music: How Music Enhances the 
Feeling of Affective Pictures, 1075 BRAIN RES. 151, 160 (2006). 
 29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (8th ed. 2004). 
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personal welfare or family relationships, (5) identifying requests for 
psychological services initiated by the victim or his family, or (6) 
conveying other information related to the impact of the offense upon the 
victim or the family as required by the court.30 
One problem with VIS is the broad discretion given to trial courts as 
to the type and amount of information admissible during VIS.  This 
discretion naturally results in inconsistent decisions regarding its 
admission, especially when it comes to music.  Although VIS are not 
regulated specifically by the Federal Rules of Evidence, they are 
governed by a strikingly similar test.31  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403 declares that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”32  In 
both state and federal courts, VIS must be excluded for similar reasons.33  
Evidence admitted during the sentencing phase of criminal trials should 
pass this test—although again, this is subject to much judicial discretion.  
Courts’ views of the prejudicial impact of VIS have changed throughout 
history, and although courts once completely banned the use of VIS in 
capital cases for being too prejudicial, recent courts have taken the 
opposite approach and rarely find information provided during VIS to be 
unduly prejudicial.  Given the Supreme Court’s past hesitation in 
admitting VIS in any capital sentencing,34 this trend is unsettling, 
especially when it comes to the prejudicial use of music during VIS.  But 
even when music is not involved, there is still disagreement over VIS 
and their role in a defendant’s sentencing. 
1. Arguments for and Against the General Use of Victim Impact 
Statements 
The battle for victims’ rights outside the courtroom began in the 
1940s and reached its peak during the 1970s.35  The focus on such rights 
was driven by multiple factors: public dissatisfaction with the criminal 
justice system’s treatment of victims, prosecutorial hopes of help from 
                                                     
 30. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498–99 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808 (1991). 
 31. See infra Part II.D (discussing the application of the Payne Court’s test). 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 33. See infra Part II.B (discussing the allowance of VIS under state and federal rules). 
 34. See infra Part II.C (discussing the history of case law involving VIS). 
 35. See Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements: 
Implications for Capital Sentencing Policy, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 492, 493 (2004). 
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victims in securing convictions, and politicians’ desires to appear tough 
on criminals and sympathetic toward victims.36  Probably the largest 
change in victims’ rights is the inclusion of VIS during sentencing. 
Even with past trends supporting victims’ rights, the debate over VIS 
continues today.  Advocates of VIS argue that allowing statements 
provides numerous advantages: victims and families may receive 
psychological benefits, the opportunity for victims to share personal 
qualities and character traits results in improved attitudes toward the 
criminal process in general, and its use results in more consistent and 
proportional sentences.37 
The Supreme Court has recognized some alternative arguments for 
allowing VIS.  First, it reasoned that some evidence about the victim 
would no doubt be admitted during the guilt phase of the trial.38  Second, 
it would be impossible for a sentencing jury to be completely free of 
evidence of the victim without having separate juries for the guilt and 
sentencing phases and introducing VIS during sentencing did nothing 
more than add to what the jury already knew.39  Finally, the Court found 
that not allowing the State to submit evidence during the sentencing 
phase placed an unfair burden on the State: 
[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating 
evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the 
sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered an individual, 
so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss 
to society and in particular to his family.40 
Another argument of which VIS supporters may be less aware is that 
victims sometimes send a message of forgiveness or a desire for leniency 
to the jurors.  For example, during the sentencing of James Bernard 
Campbell’s first two trials for the murder of Reverend Billy Bosler, the 
victim’s daughter, who had also been attacked by Campbell, gave 
emotional testimony about the attack and her life after her father’s 
death.41  Both times the jury sentenced Campbell to death, although both 
                                                     
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 839–41 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 825 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)). 
 41. Beth E. Sullivan, Note, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact 
Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 601, 601–02 (1998). 
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sentences were later remanded for resentencing for other reasons.42  The 
third time she took the stand, Bosler’s daughter changed her position and 
opposed Campbell’s death sentence to uphold the beliefs of her father, 
who opposed the death penalty.43  This time the jury came back in three 
hours with a sentence of life imprisonment.44 
Critics of VIS cite numerous drawbacks of allowing such evidence 
into the sentencing phase.  One major concern regarding VIS is the 
prejudicial and inflammatory nature of the testimony.45  Additionally, the 
majority of victims do not participate in the sentencing phase, as only 
nine percent make oral statements to the decision-maker.46  VIS are 
inconsistent with the notion that crimes are violations against the state 
rather than an individual person, as it is the state and not the victim’s 
family who is bringing suit.47  Those who violate laws should be 
convicted because public interest requires it, not simply according to the 
desires of the individual victim—whether forgiving or vengeful.48 
As a result, VIS introduce inconsistencies in sentencing because 
emotional testimony and victim qualities, rather than the defendant’s 
actions, become the focus of sentencing.49  Fairness suggests that “like 
cases ought to be treated alike,”50 and Congress appears to have had this 
goal in mind when enacting the Federal Uniform Sentencing 
Guidelines.51  And yet, sentences differ for similar crimes, suggesting 
that VIS play an important role.  Numerous studies using mock jurors 
have shown the influence VIS have on sentencing judgments—juries 
hearing VIS typically give significantly harsher sentence 
recommendations and are more likely to impose the death penalty than 
those who do not hear VIS.52 
                                                     
 42. See Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 720, 729 (Fla. 1996) (remanding for improper comments 
made by prosecutor to the jury); Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 420 (Fla. 1990) (remanding to 
include mitigating factors of defendant’s impaired capacity). 
 43. Sullivan, supra note 41, at 602. 
 44. Id. at 603. 
 45. Myers & Greene, supra note 35, at 493–94. 
 46. Id. at 493. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Andrew Ashworth, Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing, 1993 CRIM. L. REV. 498, 
503. 
 49. Myers & Greene, supra note 35, at 493. 
 50. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of 
Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1601 (1974). 
 51. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3581 (2006). 
 52. See, e.g., Bryan Myers & Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects of Victim Impact Evidence on the 
Verdicts and Sentencing Judgments of Mock Jurors, 29 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 95, 197–98 (1999); see 
also James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial: 
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995). 
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Finally, it is difficult for the defendant to introduce rebuttal 
testimony concerning the victim’s character.  Although some courts 
afford a defendant the right to cross-examine victim character evidence, 
this right is not universally recognized.53  And even if a defendant has 
such a right, it may not be in his best interest to exercise it, as a vigorous 
cross-examination of impact witnesses drawing attention to the victim’s 
flaws is not the most tactful approach.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized this difficulty, although it did not find the difficulty so 
compelling as to ban VIS altogether.54 
2. Current State and Federal Allowance in Capital Trials 
Although no rules require the admission of VIS, the majority of 
jurisdictions currently authorize their general use, many providing no 
reasoning other than citing Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court’s 
opinion allowing their admission.55  The limits and guidelines for 
admitting VIS—if any are provided at all—vary greatly by jurisdiction.  
All fifty states allow some sort of VIS in non-capital sentencing.56  
                                                     
 53. Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1255 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding a right to 
cross-examine exists during capital sentencing), with Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (finding no right to cross-examine during capital sentencing). 
 54. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (“[T]he mere fact that for tactical 
reasons it might not be prudent for the defense to rebut victim impact evidence makes the case no 
different than others in which a party is faced with this sort of dilemma.”). 
 55. See John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 257, 267–68 (2003) (stating that thirty-three of the thirty-eight states that have the 
death penalty allow VIS and that most states have made this decision with little or no reasoned 
analysis other than a citation to Payne). 
 56. The following state statutes specifically provide for victim impact evidence from the 
victim’s family in some form or another: ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.022 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-65-102, -109 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
1191.1 (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-4.1-302, -302.5 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 54-220 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4331 (West 2006); D.C. CODE § 23-103 
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (West 2003); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-5306(1), (3) (West 2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/6 (West 2008); IND. 
CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
1019 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.500, .520 (West 2006); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
875(B) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6101, tit. 17-A § 1257 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 11-403 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3(p) (West 2004); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.752, .791 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611A.01, .037 (West 
2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-151 to -161 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.762 (1993); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2521 (West 2009); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-26-
3, -4 (West 2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 390.30(3)(b) (McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
15A-825 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-34-01, -02(14) (West 2008); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2947.051, 2929.12 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 982, 984 (West 2003); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137.530(3), 144.790(3) (West 2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9738 
(West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-28-3 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1515 (2003); 
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Thirty-five of the thirty-eight capital states,57 as well as the military,58 
allow VIS during capital sentencing.  Few states place substantive or 
procedural limits on the types and amount of victim impact evidence 
admissible.59 
In federal courts, the U.S. Code specifically allows for VIS in 
hearings to determine whether a death sentence is justified.60  According 
to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA),61 VIS and other 
evidence of effects on the victim and the victim’s family can be used as 
non-statutory aggravating factors as long as one statutory aggravating 
factor exists.62  Federal prosecuting attorneys are merely required to 
notify the defendant as to what types of VIS will be used, although state 
courts do not have such requirements.63 
                                                                                                                       
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28C-1 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-207, -38-203 (West 2008); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.03 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (West 2004); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.5, -299.1 (West 2007); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.69.020, .030 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-11A-2, -3 (West 
2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950.04 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-21-101, -13-303 (West 
2007).  Alabama and Nevada do not provide for VIS from the family, but do allow statements from 
the victim.  ALA. CODE § 15-23-73 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.145 (West 2000). 
 57. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-47(b) (1995), 15-23-72(2)(c) (2006); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 
2.1(A)(7); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(4)(a)(iii) (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE, § 190.3 (West 
2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-
46d (West 2007), 54-220(a)(2) (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4331 (West 2006); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 921.143 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
19-5306 (West 2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/3, 120/6 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
50-2-9(e) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7333 to -7338; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.520 
(West 2006); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 11-
401, -403 (West 2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.762 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112 (2009); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2261 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-K(II)(P) (2007); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-4(G) (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-A833 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2930.02, .14, 2947.051 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984.1 (West 2003); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137.013, 163.150(1)(a) (West 2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 
2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-15A-43 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c) (West 2008); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1) (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207(2)(a)(iii) (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.5, -299.1 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 10.95.060(3), .070 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-21-101 to -103 (West 2007). 
 58. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES § 1001(b)(4) (2008) (permitting 
introduction of victim-impact evidence in trials); § 1004(b)(2) (permitting introduction of such 
evidence in capital trials). 
 59. See John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 257, 268–76 (2003) (noting the wide array of jurisdictions and circumstances in 
which victim impact evidence is admissible).  See generally Justin D. Flamm, Due Process on the 
“Uncharted Seas of Irrelevance”: Limiting the Presence of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital 
Sentencing After Payne v. Tennessee, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295, 296 (1999) (noting broad 
admission of victim impact evidence, especially among capital states). 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2006). 
 61. Id. 
 62. § 3593(c). 
 63. See Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 5, 6 (2006). 
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Trial courts have broad discretion as to the type and amount of VIS 
that are admissible.  VIS are not regulated specifically by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence; instead, the Code sets out a test similar to both 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the Supreme Court’s test set out in 
Payne:64 “Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under 
the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that 
information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the 
danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading 
the jury.”65 
This broad discretion exercised by trial judges has resulted in vast 
amounts of material being admitted in VIS.  Upon review, the 
information admitted is rarely found to be prejudicial.  No federal,66 and 
few state death sentences have been overturned as a result of unduly 
prejudicial VIS.67  For example, the failure of the FDPA to limit the 
number of VIS has resulted in multiple and sometimes repetitive 
testimonies for a single victim.68  In cases involving multiple victims, the 
court is free to allow testimony based on whatever number of witnesses it 
deems appropriate to show the harm or impact of the crime.69  
Additionally, although the FDPA refers only to testimony regarding the 
impact on the victim and the victim’s family,70 both federal and state 
courts have failed to restrict such testimony to victims and family and 
have allowed other community members to make VIS.71 
Trial courts’ discretion in allowing VIS is not only limited to the 
amount of evidence; it extends to the scope of evidence admitted as well.  
                                                     
 64. See infra Part II.D. 
 65. § 3593(c). 
 66. See Logan, supra note 63, at 6 (as of a study done on Westlaw through 2006). 
 67. See, e.g., Wimberly v. State, 759 So. 2d 568, 574 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (reversing on 
other grounds but noting that admission of improper victim impact evidence would have, by itself, 
warranted a new sentencing); Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 793, 796–97 (Ky. 1991) 
(ordering new trial due to improper statements of family’s grief); State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 
973 (La. 1992) (remanding for lack of pretrial hearing regarding impact evidence admissibility); 
State v. Hightower, 680 A.2d 649, 662 (N.J. 1996) (finding defendant should have been granted 
mistrial after admission of prejudicial impact evidence). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 779 (8th Cir. 2001) (allowing eleven 
witnesses, including a former coworker, two bank employees, and the victim’s ex-wife) vacated, 
Allen v. United States, 536 U.S. 953 (2002); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 818 (4th Cir. 
2000) (allowing seven witnesses for a double murder). 
 69. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998) (allowing thirty-eight 
witnesses to testify about the impact of the Oklahoma City bombing). 
 70. § 3593(a). 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 712–13 (8th Cir. 2003) (allowing a 
teacher, neighbor, and classmate to testify); United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 
2002) (allowing friend and former coworker); Allen, 247 F.3d at 779 (allowing a coworker and 
former coworker); United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing coworker). 
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The FDPA provides that VIS may refer to “the effect of the offense on 
the victim and the victim’s family . . . .”72  Courts have included in this 
definition evidence regarding personal traits of victims, finding such 
evidence shows “each victim’s uniqueness as an individual human 
being . . . .”73  The FDPA does put forth a requirement, which many 
states lack, that jurors certify that the background information of the 
victim and the defendant did not influence the decision to impose a 
capital sentence.74  Federal and most state courts have, however, refused 
to allow VIS to include evidence of other crimes,75 or opinions regarding 
the defendant and whether death should be imposed.76  Yet, even with 
these limitations, vast amounts of prejudicial information are allowed, 
resulting in a need for stricter limitations on what can be admitted in 
VIS—especially when music is involved. 
C. Case History 
The United States Supreme Court first looked at the general use of 
VIS during the sentencing phase of a capital trial in Booth v. Maryland in 
1987.77  Booth was convicted of murdering an elderly couple in their 
Baltimore home, leaving the bodies to be discovered by their son two 
days later.78  During the penalty phase the government introduced VIS 
from the son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter, and Booth was 
sentenced to death.79  The family’s statements described the personal 
qualities of the victims, the impact the deaths had on the family and 
community, and the emotional and personal problems the family suffered 
as a result of the deaths.80  The testimony regarded Booth as someone 
who could “‘[n]ever be rehabilitated’” and described the victims as being 
“‘butchered like animals.’”81  Defense counsel moved to exclude the 
statements as so irrelevant and unduly inflammatory that it violated the 
                                                     
 72. § 3593(a). 
 73. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted). 
 74. § 3593(f). 
 75. See United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 193 (D. Mass. 2004) (stating that 
allowing VIS on prior offenses would “create too great a risk that the jury would be influenced by 
sympathy and passion”).  But see State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 204–05 (N.C. 1994) (allowing 
VIS from child of defendant’s previous murder victim). 
 76. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2 (1991) (upholding Booth’s provision that characterizations 
and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the sentence may not be included in VIS). 
 77. 482 U.S. 496, 496–97 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 78. Id. at 498. 
 79. Id. at 499. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 500. 
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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.82  The Court, in a five-to-four decision, agreed, holding that 
the information provided in the VIS was irrelevant and created a 
“constitutionally unacceptable risk” that the jury would act arbitrarily 
and capriciously in determining the sentence.83 
The Booth decision determined that when VIS are involved, the 
focus is not on the defendant, but on the victim’s character and 
reputation—factors that may be irrelevant to the culpability of the 
defendant and circumstances of which the defendant may not even be 
aware.84  Families are able to and will express their grief in different 
ways, and one family’s ability to convey a stronger message of grief than 
another has nothing to do with whether one defendant should receive a 
stronger sentence than another.85  Additionally, defendants should not be 
sentenced according to the victim’s positive involvement in the 
community.86  The Court noted that emotional opinions from family 
members could incite the jury and distract it from deciding the case on 
relevant evidence;87 as a result, the Court barred the use of VIS during 
the sentencing phase of capital murder trials unless directly relating to 
the crime’s circumstances.88 
The Supreme Court reiterated this opinion in South Carolina v. 
Gathers,89 finding that prosecutors’ statements focusing on victim 
characteristics were as dangerous as those discussed in Booth and equally 
likely to result in arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty.90  The Court found only testimony relating to the 
“blameworthiness” of a defendant to be relevant and permissible during 
sentencing.91 
                                                     
 82. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and usual punishments inflicted.”). 
 83. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502–03. 
 84. Id. at 504–05. 
 85. See id. at 505–06 (“Certainly the degree to which a family is willing and able to express its 
grief is irrelevant to the decision whether a defendant, who may merit the death penalty, should live 
or die.” (citing Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098, 1129 (Md. 1986) (Cole, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part))). 
 86. See id. at 506 (“[There is no] justification for permitting [a sentencing] decision to turn on 
the perception that the victim was a sterling member of the community rather than someone of 
questionable character.”). 
 87. Id. at 508. 
 88. See id. at 507, 507 n.10 (generally disallowing VIS during capital sentencing but 
recognizing that “[s]imilar types of information may well be admissible because they relate directly 
to the circumstances of the crime”). 
 89. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 90. Id. at 811. 
 91. Id. at 810 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987)). 
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The Supreme Court reversed both Booth and Gathers in Payne v. 
Tennessee,92 deciding there should be no per se bar prohibiting VIS in 
capital sentences.93  Payne was convicted of two counts of first-degree 
murder and an assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree 
and was sentenced to death.94  During his sentencing, the State presented 
testimony by a family member who described how the events affected 
the surviving victim, a four-year-old boy.95  She articulated the child’s 
confusion as to why his mother and sister were no longer around.96  The 
Supreme Court upheld the admission of the testimony, finding that such 
information is only barred if it is “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the 
trial fundamentally unfair.”97 
The Payne Court saw VIS as “simply another form or method [used 
by a state to inform] the sentencing authority about the specific harm 
caused by the crime in question.”98  The Court reasoned that such 
statements serve a legitimate purpose by exhibiting the “defendant’s 
moral culpability and blameworthiness,”99 so it is unfair to bar the State 
from offering “a quick glimpse of the life [the defendant] chose to 
extinguish,” while the defendant is able to enter mitigating evidence with 
virtually no limits.100  VIS are entered in part to show each victim’s 
“‘uniqueness as an individual human being,’”101 and statements meeting 
this purpose should be admitted as long as the evidence is not unduly 
prejudicial, in which case the defendant can seek remedy under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.102 
                                                     
 92. 501 U.S. 808, at 830 (1991). 
 93. Id. at 827. 
 94. Id. at 811. 
 95. Id. at 814–15 (“‘He cries for his mom.  He doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t 
come home.  And he cries for his sister Lacie.  He comes to me many times during the week and 
asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie.  And I tell him yes.  He says, I’m worried about my 
Lacie.’”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 825.  See also infra Part II.D (defining the test). 
 98. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 822 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 101. Id. at 823. 
 102. Id. at 825.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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The test put forth in Payne gives courts little direction as to how to 
limit evidence offered as VIS.103  Payne’s instructions allowing evidence 
of each victim’s “‘uniqueness as an individual human being’”104 and 
informing “the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by 
the crime in question”105 are far from specific.  The authority to admit 
VIS is left very much to the trial court’s discretion, leaving open the 
possibility for abuse. 
The wide discretion offered to courts is evidenced by the various 
attempts to apply Payne specifically to VIS involving music.  Such cases 
have reached varying results, and a universal application of the standard 
is needed—one that denies admission of music during VIS.  Although 
some VIS include music only to exhibit a victim’s specific talent or in 
other ways that supplement live testimony,106 the vast majority of VIS 
involving music are in cases where a victim has died and the prosecution 
offers a photo montage of the victim’s life.107 
The first widely cited case applying Payne’s guidelines to the 
admission of music during VIS was Salazar v. State,108 decided in 2002.  
There, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a picture montage 
set to music.109  The defendant, a sixteen-year-old special-education 
student, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.110  During 
sentencing, the state showed a video tribute of the victim consisting of 
140 photographs set to the music of “Storms in Africa” and “River” by 
Enya and Celine Dion’s “My Heart Will Go On.”111  The court held that 
admitting the video was reversible error as it was “very lengthy, highly 
emotional, and barely probative.”112  Although the pictures in the video  
 
                                                     
 103. See infra Part II.D. 
 104. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823. 
 105. Id. at 824–25. 
 106. See, e.g., State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462, 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (admitting a video with 
background music illustrating the victim with her children); Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 230 
(Md. 1995) (admitting a video of the victim playing piano, a skill for which the victim was 
nationally known). 
 107. All but one case discussed in this comment occurred when the victim had died.  In 
Petruccelli v. State, the victim survived but suffered severe mental and physical disabilities, and 
music was used during a tape depicting the impact on her life.  184 S.W.3d 747, 747–48 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2006). 
 108. 90 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
 109. Id. at 332. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Salazar, 90 S.W.3d at 333. 
 112. Id. at 338. 
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alone were enough to require reversal,113 the background music “greatly 
amplifie[d] the prejudicial effect of the original error.”114 
A district court in Massachusetts refused to allow a similar video 
tribute in United States v. Sampson.115  The defendant in Sampson was 
convicted of murdering several people, including a young college student 
who had picked up the hitchhiking defendant, and the jury returned a 
verdict of death.116  The government sought to introduce a memorial 
video of the college victim during the sentencing.  The video was made 
in preparation of a memorial service, lasted twenty-seven minutes, 
included over 200 photographs, and was set to background music of The 
Beatles and James Taylor.117  The court refused to admit the video, 
finding that any probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, which could result in the jury reaching a sympathetic verdict 
instead of one based on reason.118  Although the court admitted that the 
tape would have been unduly prejudicial even without the background 
music, the “evocative accompanying music [together with] the 
videotape’s images would have inflamed the passion and sympathy of 
the jury.”119 
In People v. Kelly,120 the defendant was convicted of murdering a 
nineteen-year-old girl by becoming her personal trainer, luring her into 
his home, and stabbing her to death with a pair of scissors.121  The jury 
returned a verdict of death.122  During the sentencing phase of the trial, 
the California Supreme Court allowed a twenty-minute video montage 
prepared by the victim’s mother consisting of photographs and videos 
depicting the victim’s life.123  The victim’s mother narrated during the 
playing of the tape while the music of Enya played in the background.124  
The court found the tape “properly focused on [the victim’s] life and the 
pain her death caused her family and friends.”125  The court did, 
                                                     
 113. The pictures spanned the victim’s entire lifetime and there were numerous photos of the 
victim as a smiling child.  The court found these to be severely prejudicial as it appeared as though 
the defendant had murdered a child instead of an adult.  See id. at 337. 
 114. Id. at 339. 
 115. 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 116. Id. at 175. 
 117. Id. at 191. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 192–93. 
 120. 171 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008). 
 121. Id. at 553–55. 
 122. Id. at 548. 
 123. Id. at 570. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 568. 
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however, recognize an irrelevant aspect of the video—the background 
music.126  Although recognizing music as a whole is not per se 
impermissible (there was no error in including a segment of the victim 
singing “You Light Up My Life” as a solo at school),127 the court found 
the background music irrelevant, even though the mother testified that it 
was some of the victim’s favorite music.128  Including the music did 
nothing but add an emotional element to the video, yet the court still did 
not find including the music to be so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal 
in light of the trial as a whole.129 
Both state and federal courts have allowed the use of music during 
photo montages under Payne’s rationale that the pictures show the 
victim’s uniqueness and give the sentencing authority a better view of 
the harm caused.  Even though the addition of background music to these 
pictures is not probative and it is the pictures themselves that are 
relevant, lower courts have been inconsistent in their analysis of when 
music becomes unduly prejudicial.  The United States Supreme Court 
recently had turned down a chance to clarify its view on the prejudice of 
such videos when it chose not to review the decision in Kelly v. 
California.130  Justice Stevens recognized the need to clarify Payne to the 
lower courts: 
[Payne’s test] represents the beginning and end of the guidance we 
have given to lower courts considering the admissibility of victim 
impact evidence . . . . 
 . . . [L]ower courts throughout the country have largely failed to 
place clear limits on the scope, quantity, or kind of victim impact 
evidence capital juries are permitted to consider. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he Court has a duty to consider what reasonable limits should 
be placed on its use.131 
                                                     
 126. Id. at 571. 
 127. Id. at 570–71. 
 128. Id. at 571–72. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008). 
 131. Id. at 566–67 (2008) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petitions for writs of 
certiorari). 
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D. The Current Standard 
Presently, the allowance of VIS is governed by the test set out in 
Payne.  This standard, however, leaves great discretion to the trial courts, 
which have repeatedly allowed highly prejudicial music during VIS.  A 
court’s real duty is to use its discretion to ensure that the evidence’s 
probative value outweighs the sincere danger of unfair prejudice—which 
could inflame the jury’s passions and, in the words of Payne, “risk a 
verdict impermissibly based on passion, not deliberation.”132  By 
allowing background music during VIS, courts are failing in this task. 
1. Payne’s Test 
Payne allows admission of information relating to “each victim’s 
‘uniqueness as an individual human being’” and “informing the 
sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in 
question.”133  The Court’s inclusion of this standard places some limits 
on a trial court’s authority to admit VIS.  VIS must first meet one of 
these two goals, then they are admissible as long as they are not “so 
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair,”134 in 
which case the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits admission.135 
The background music in VIS does not establish either goal; it is the 
actual testimony offered during VIS that describes the individual’s 
uniqueness and informs those listening of the harm.  As a result, 
background music itself is not relevant evidence.  Such music, however, 
typically only accompanies photos depicting deceased victims, and 
courts are generally willing to admit a number of photos of the victim to 
show the victim’s individuality.136  When irrelevant evidence is offered 
along with any sort of relevant testimony,137 the court then must analyze 
                                                     
 132. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 823, 825 (emphasis in original). 
 134. Id. at 825. 
 135. See id.; see also supra text of note 102 (quoting the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 136. See supra Part II.C (discussing admission of photo montages set to background music as 
victim impact evidence). 
 137. The Payne Court left it to the states to decide for themselves what VIS are relevant, 
suggesting the admission of VIS should be decided under the same standards as other evidentiary 
decisions regarding relevance: 
A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of 
the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not 
the death penalty should be imposed.  There is no reason to treat such evidence 
differently than other relevant evidence is treated. 
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.  The lack of a bright-line rule for relevance often requires a case-by-case 
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the entire statement under the Payne standard.  Trial courts must thus 
focus on whether the inclusion of the irrelevant evidence is “so unduly 
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.”138 
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. McVeigh explained the duty of 
the jury: 
 Payne allows the introduction of victim impact testimony to aid the 
jury in making a “reasoned moral response” when imposing sentence 
upon a defendant convicted of a capital offense.  First, the sentence 
must be the result of a reasoned decision.  The evidence must not be so 
unduly prejudicial that its admission allows emotion to overwhelm 
reason.  Second, the sentence must be based on moral considerations.  
Because the consequences of the crime are an important ingredient in 
the moral equation, the government can present testimony 
demonstrating the harm caused by the defendant’s actions.  Third, the 
sentence must reflect the jury’s judgment.  The jury must balance all of 
the relevant mitigating and aggravating factors in determining an 
appropriate sentence.139 
2. Defining the Standard 
To truly understand how to apply Payne’s test, its terminology must 
be defined.  Courts have some guidelines to follow when deciding if 
evidence in general is too prejudicial.  The official comment to Rule 403 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which excludes relevant evidence that 
is outweighed by unfair prejudice, defines “unfair prejudice” as “an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, 
though not necessarily, an emotional one.”140  Although Rule 403 does 
not govern admission of VIS, the Payne test is strikingly similar.  As 
previously discussed, music has an effect on emotion, which, in turn, 
affects decision-making.  Because music has a proven tendency to affect 
a juror’s decision-making, it should be deemed prejudicial, by the very 
definition of undue prejudice. 
Previously, courts have held that VIS involving opinions regarding 
the defendant or possible sentences are unduly prejudicial.  It is too 
                                                                                                                       
determination.  See, e.g., State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998) (“[T]here is no bright-
line test, and the admissibility of specific types of victim impact evidence must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.”). 
 138. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. 
 139. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1217 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 140. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.  Similarly designed state rules of evidence 
add to this standard.  See, e.g., PA. R. EVID. 403 (defining unfair prejudice as “a tendency to suggest 
[a] decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the 
evidence impartially”). 
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difficult for jurors to ignore such inflammatory remarks; additionally, 
opinions are irrelevant as they do not address either purpose of VIS.  For 
example, an Oklahoma court found “[s]tatements that the defendant 
acted ‘like [a] blood thirsty animal[],’” “‘a parasite’, and a ‘murderous 
animal’” when he ‘“butchered [the victim] like an animal’” to be unduly 
prejudicial.141  Although the court found the statements unduly 
prejudicial, it reversed on other grounds and did not address whether the 
existence of prejudice violated due process, stating only that “[t]he more 
a jury is exposed to the emotional aspects of a victim’s death, the less 
likely their verdict will be a ‘reasoned moral response’ to the question 
whether a defendant deserves to die; and the greater risk a defendant will 
be deprived of Due Process.”142 
It is equally frustrating to define the standard “fundamentally 
unfair.”  The Supreme Court has even had trouble defining the term, 
stating that fundamental fairness is “a requirement whose meaning can 
be as opaque as its importance is lofty.”143  Deciding what makes an 
entire trial fundamentally unfair is especially challenging, as it depends 
heavily on the particular facts of each individual case.  Apart from its 
difficulty, courts may be reluctant to set a firm definition because it 
would severely limit appellate courts’ discretion to decide cases 
challenging their fundamental fairness.144 
Courts have established that analyzing a due process claim for 
fundamental fairness requires considering the challenged conduct in 
relation to the trial as a whole.  The Payne Court similarly suggested this 
tactic by using Darden v. Wainwright145 to illustrate how to analyze due 
process claims.146  The defendant in Darden argued that the 
prosecution’s closing remarks rendered his conviction fundamentally 
unfair, thus depriving his sentencing of any Eighth Amendment 
protection.147  The Supreme Court evaluated the comments in light of the 
trial as a whole, considering other relevant factors such as the trial 
court’s instructions to the jury and the other overwhelming evidence of 
                                                     
 141. Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 920–21 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
 142. Id. at 921 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)). 
 143. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). 
 144. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1477 (10th Cir. 1990) (“As a result, the 
constitutional guarantee of a fundamentally fair trial cannot be defined with reference to 
particularized legal elements, which would limit the discretion of courts to determine whether a trial 
was fundamentally unfair.  Precisely because a fundamental-fairness analysis is not subject to clearly 
definable legal elements, however, we must approach such analysis with considerable self-
restraint.”). 
 145. 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
 146. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 179–83). 
 147. Darden, 477 U.S. at 178–79. 
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the defendant’s guilt.148  Using Darden as a guide, the Payne Court 
established that fundamental fairness questions over VIS should use a 
similar rationale, and fundamental fairness questions should be decided 
in view of the trial as a whole. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Allowing music in VIS stretches the Payne decision too far.  Music 
does not meet either of the VIS objectives set out in Payne; as such, it is 
irrelevant.  Courts currently applying the Payne standard repeatedly 
admit that including music is prejudicial, but have been unwilling to find 
its admission fundamentally unfair.  As discussed above, music’s 
emotional effects reveal its highly prejudicial influence on emotion, 
which, in turn, affects decision-making.  This added emotion creates a 
great danger of arbitrary decision-making.  After realizing this risk and 
applying other rationales courts use when deciding to admit evidence, it 
is clear that music cannot be admitted.  Prohibiting the use of music is 
necessary now and will only become more so in the future as 
advancements in technology make using music easier and more common.  
Adding music to already emotional VIS does nothing but play on juror 
emotions and interfere with a jury’s ability to make a decision on reason 
and merits.  The result: an unacceptably high risk of arbitrary and 
unreliable decisions, denying defendants a fundamentally fair sentencing. 
A. Courts Applying Payne to Music Produce Inconsistent Results 
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed VIS admission in 
capital trials since Payne, lower state and federal courts have since been 
applying the Payne standard to VIS.  Cases specifically involving 
background music have produced varying decisions, even in those cases 
involving similar facts.149  These various results demonstrate the need for 
a new and universal application of Payne’s test when background music 
is involved, and the prejudicial impact of such music demands that courts 
deny its admission and protect defendants from such arbitrary results. 
Courts applying the Payne standard to cases involving musical VIS 
have reached varying conclusions, even failing to uniformly rule 
regarding music of the same artist.  The California Supreme Court, in 
                                                     
 148. Id. at 181–82. 
 149. See supra Part II.C. 
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People v. Kelly,150 allowed a twenty-minute photo montage that included 
the music of Enya.151  In United States v. Sampson,152 a Massachusetts 
district court viewed a similar video lasting twenty-seven minutes and set 
to the music of The Beatles and James Taylor, and determined it to be 
unduly prejudicial.153  And the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
recognized the prejudice of allowing the music of Celine Dion and Enya 
to accompany a picture montage in Salazar v. State.154  Because courts 
are applying a test based on discretion, some variation can be expected.  
However, correct application of the Payne standard should never result 
in admission of music during VIS because music in VIS is always 
irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and fundamentally unfair. 
B. The Emotions Created by Music Cause Prejudicial Emotional 
Decisions That Result in a Fundamentally Unfair Trial 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear its position that 
sentencing decisions should be based on reason.  “[P]unishment should 
be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant.  Thus, the 
sentence imposed . . . should reflect a reasoned moral response . . . rather 
than mere sympathy or emotion.”155  Yet, by allowing music during 
sentencing, courts risk the inevitable result that an irrelevant and 
prejudicial factor will influence juror decisions and cause arbitrary 
results.  Courts themselves have admitted that music is prejudicial, but 
somehow fail to find that this amounts to a fundamentally unfair 
sentencing.156  When music is played during sentencing, its prejudicial 
influences invite the jury to make arbitrary decisions, which are 
                                                     
 150. 171 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 564 (2008). 
 151. Id. at 570. 
 152. 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 153. Id. at 191. 
 154. 90 S.W.3d 330, 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
 155. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in 
original).  Other opinions have specifically warned against arbitrary decisions in death penalty cases.  
See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (“It is of vital importance to the defendant and to 
the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason 
rather than caprice or emotion.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“[W]here discretion 
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life 
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the 
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”). 
 156. See United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 192–93 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding that 
“evocative accompanying music [together with] the videotape’s images would have inflamed the 
passion and sympathy of the jury”); Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) 
(reversing for prejudice of admitted photos, but finding that the background music “greatly 
amplifie[d] the prejudicial effect of the original error”). 
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forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.157  As the Supreme Court warned, 
“[i]t would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a 
defendant to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors’ emotional 
sensitivities with our longstanding recognition that, above all, capital 
sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary.”158 
Jurors are expected to decide based on evidence and reason, 
especially when making a decision involving life or death.  The Supreme 
Court has noted, “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the 
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear 
to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.”159  Yet, in highly 
emotional trials—especially when making sentencing decisions—
eliminating natural human emotions could prove to be a difficult task.  
As a result, numerous studies have focused on mock jurors in the trial 
setting to see exactly what effect emotion has on decision-making.160 
Emotion can be defined as realized or unrealized “feelings, 
cognitions, and actions or inclinations to act.”161  Emotions typically 
serve to signal environmental changes and to provide guidance when 
choosing and evaluating competing goals and morals.162  As such, it is 
only natural for emotions to come into play when making a decision.  
Feigenson and Park established three ways emotion can affect judgment 
in the legal realm.  Emotions can affect the way one processes 
information in general, changing from “bottom-up” decisions based on 
data to “top-down or schema-driven” evaluations.163  Thus, instead of 
deciding on a factual basis, emotions such as anger may cause jurors to 
use stereotypes to find defendants liable for a stereotypical offense.164  
The effect an emotion has on processing depends on the emotion itself.  
“Certain” emotions like anger, disgust, and happiness lead to a perceived 
confidence that can cause jurors to process information less 
systematically—resulting in consideration of fewer factors and an 
inability to distinguish strong from weak arguments.165  Thus, the 
                                                     
 157. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 158. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990). 
 159. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). 
 160. Although these studies focus on jurors in the guilt phase of a trial, the implications can be 
carried over to the sentencing phase. 
 161. Neal Feigenson & Jaihyun Park, Emotions and Attributions of Legal Responsibility and 
Blame: A Research Review, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 144 (2006). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 147–48. 
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decision is less thought-out or thoroughly reviewed.  “Uncertain” 
emotions such as hope, anxiety, and some types of sadness will not have 
the same result.166  Additionally, angry individuals rationalize differently 
than saddened individuals. 167 
Emotions can also bias judgment by directing jurors through a 
“mood-congruency effect,” which causes people to interpret information 
depending on emotion.168  Jurors feeling negative emotions will perceive 
ambiguous events negatively, recall more negative information, and be 
negatively biased when asked to make a judgment regarding that 
event.169  This effect can be reduced if the decision-maker recognizes the 
bias and makes a sufficient effort to correct it;170 however, this process 
may result in overcorrection, and a result in the opposite direction.171 
Research has established that emotions do influence decision-making 
and that different emotions do so differently.  Although there are many 
chances during a trial for emotion to affect judgment,172 many studies 
have used mock-juror research to specifically study how jurors place 
blame after hearing VIS.  In mock-juror research, those listening to VIS 
perceive greater suffering than those not exposed to VIS.173  This results 
in longer sentences to those defendants causing high amounts of 
suffering and lower sentences to defendants causing less.174  Similarly, in 
death penalty cases, participants hearing VIS from the family voted for 
                                                     
 166. Id. at 148. 
 167. Bryan Myers et al., Psychology Weighs in on the Debate Surrounding Victim Impact 
Statements and Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors Really Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 
13, 16 (2006).  Angry individuals tend to make less-rational dispositional attributions (view the 
person as at fault) while saddened individuals seem to make more rational situational attributions 
(view the situation as at fault) when placing blame.  Id. 
 168. Feigenson & Park, supra note 161, at 144–45. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 149 (citing Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Flexible Correction Processes in 
Social Judgment: Correcting for Context-Induced Contrast, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
137 (1993); Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction Model: The Role of 
Naïve Theories of Bias in Bias Correction, 29 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 
(1997)). 
 171. Id. (citing Leonard Berkowitz et al., Some Conditions Affecting Overcorrect ion of the 
Judgment-Distorting Influence of One’s Feelings, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT 
IN SOCIAL COGNITION 131 (Joseph P. Forgas ed. 2000)). 
 172. The theory of “affect infusion” suggests that trials produce tendencies for emotions to 
influence judgments.  This theory asserts that emotions have a higher influence on judgments during 
constructive information processing (using nondirected search strategies or cognitive elaboration to 
find a solution, as when trying to decide why an individual may have committed a crime) rather than 
during directed processing (using a predetermined method, as when trying to recall someone’s 
name).  See Myers & Greene, supra note 35, at 501. 
 173. Myers et al., supra note 167, at 15. 
 174. Myers & Greene, supra note 35, at 497.  One should note that this study involved VIS from 
the victims themselves, and not from third parties. 
0.6.0_SCHROEDER FINAL 1/4/2010  10:36:41 AM 
498 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
the death penalty 51% of the times, while only 20% did so when no VIS 
were present.175  It is also interesting to note another study showing that 
jurors receiving no VIS tended to give longer sentences than those who 
heard VIS indicating there was only mild harm—suggesting that jurors 
expect some degree of suffering from victims and that VIS are most 
influential when the suffering exceeds those expectations.176  Thus, if a 
jury expects a certain amount of grief from a family, but the VIS use 
music and amplify the level of sadness, the result in those cases will be 
harsher punishment that is not based on reason, but on emotion. 
This is not to say that emotion should have no place in a trial.  
Emotional witnesses provide cues to jurors as to how they should feel, 
and studies show that individuals witnessing strong emotional displays 
can become emotional themselves.177  In some cases jurors may 
empathize with witnesses just from hearing descriptions of emotional 
suffering but still remain able to set emotions aside when it is time to 
reach a decision.178  Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess whether sentences are imposed rationally or by emotions alone.179  
Judgments based on emotion alone are obviously prejudicial; however, 
reasoned judgments may be accompanied by emotion without 
introducing prejudice.180  Alternatively, emotion from witnesses may in 
some cases add to a juror’s rational assessment if he reasons that greater 
harm and suffering should result in harsher punishment.181 
How can decision-makers experiencing emotion reduce bias?  
Research indicates that decision-makers who are “(i) aware of the 
unwanted influence; (ii) motivated to correct the bias; (iii) aware of the 
magnitude and direction of the bias; and (iv) able to adjust the response 
appropriately” can successfully correct the effects of emotion.182  
Unfortunately, ideal jurors capable of this are unlikely to exist at every 
trial.  Many jurors are unaware of the influence, and those who are aware 
most likely do not know how to successfully counter its effects—
resulting in bias from overcorrection.183 
The judicial system is structured to help keep jurors on track and 
away from emotional decisions.  Careful and accurate jury 
                                                     
 175. Id. at 498. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 504. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Feigenson & Park, supra note 161, at 156. 
 183. Id. 
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instructions,184 jurors who feel accountable for their decisions,185 and the 
desire to avoid perceived injustice can help attenuate incidental 
emotional influences.186  Additionally, group deliberation and delays 
between hearing testimony and deliberation may help lessen emotional 
influence.187 
However, when it comes to sentencing judgments by juries, it is the 
courts themselves that could have the greatest impact on reducing 
emotional judgments by limiting VIS in scope and amount, excluding 
victim opinions of the defendant or the crime, and providing jurors with 
instructions that explain the purpose and function of VIS.188  Courts 
could additionally take on the responsibility of privately viewing all 
evidence offered to decide whether admission would prevent a 
fundamentally fair trial.189  Some courts even recognize that prosecutors 
may play a role in preventing misuse of emotional VIS.  As the Georgia 
Supreme Court stated: 
I urge district attorneys to cautiously approach the use of such victim 
impact evidence.  It benefits neither the victim, the victim’s family, nor 
the public if successful advocacy results in the admission of irrelevant, 
prejudicial and inflammatory evidence which will then require new 
sentencing trials and further unduly delay the finality of death penalty 
cases.190 
Unfortunately, a revolution in the admission of prejudicial VIS will 
come not from the prosecution, but from the courts themselves.  Courts 
need to adopt an application of the Payne standard that prohibits music in 
VIS and accounts for the highly prejudicial effect music has on emotions 
and decision-making.  This is necessary to ensure a just sentencing. 
Courts must consider evidence’s prejudicial effect when considering 
admission.  Irrelevant background music is highly likely to affect the jury 
in an irrational and prejudicial way.  Research indicates music can 
actually create new emotions, or can amplify those already existing.191  
Adding more emotion to VIS is dangerous, as VIS are highly emotional 
                                                     
 184. Id. at 156. 
 185. Id. at 147, 156. 
 186. Id. at 147. 
 187. See Myers et al., supra note 167, at 18 (stating that “in the research we have addressed, 
none of the studies investigated the effects of group deliberation on these emotions or the effects of 
an extended delay”). 
 188. Myers & Greene, supra note 35, at 506–09. 
 189. United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 187 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 190. Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 754 (Ga. 1994) (Fletcher, J., concurring). 
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
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in and of themselves.  Allowing emotional music will do nothing but add 
more unneeded emotion to an already highly emotional time, making 
jurors more likely to base their decisions on factors other than the merits.  
Emotional jurors result in arbitrary decisions, the very result the United 
States Supreme Court cautioned courts to avoid. 
C. Other Considerations for Not Admitting VIS Involving Music 
Courts that have faced a decision of whether or not to admit music 
have included a number of factors in their analyses, and by looking at 
what courts have thought important, one can see that music is not fit for 
admission.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals suggested a four-factor 
test for courts to apply when trying to make admission decisions under 
Payne’s admissibility test.  The proposed factors include (1) the 
evidence’s probative value, (2) the potential to affect the jury in an 
irrational and unforgettable way, (3) the time needed to develop the 
evidence, and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence to be admitted.192  
These factors, among others, can likewise apply when analyzing the 
inclusion of background music in VIS. 
1.  Probative Value 
Prosecutors cannot argue that background music adds any probative 
value to VIS.  In fact, many courts discussing the admission of 
background music have ruled that its existence is irrelevant to the issues 
at hand.193  Showing a victim’s uniqueness or details of the specific harm 
could be effectively communicated through spoken testimony or even 
pictures.  The proponents of VIS will most likely use live witnesses to 
establish proper foundation; there is no reason why these live witnesses 
could not testify to any details of the victim or the harm caused.  Because 
music lacks any probative value, there is no useful factual information 
that music can provide.  As such, prohibiting music will not deprive the 
State of any right afforded by VIS—the jury will still hear of all the 
information pertaining to the victim’s individuality and the harm caused,  
 
                                                     
 192. Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
 193. See, e.g., United States v. Reveles, No. ACM 29029, 1993 WL 135864, at *8 (A.F.C.M.R. 
April 27, 1993) (refusing to allow music or singing in the background of video); People v. Zamudio, 
181 P.3d 105, 136 (Cal. 2008) (excluding a videotape’s audio portion, finding it unduly prejudicial 
and inappropriate); State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462, 467 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (allowing musical 
accompaniment of video even though it was not a valid exercise of the victim’s right to be heard); 
Salazar, 90 S.W.3d at 338 (finding the video was “‘accompanied by irrelevant background music’”). 
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while the State’s interest in counteracting the defendant’s mitigating 
evidence is protected. 
2.  Relevance 
Evidence must be relevant to be admitted, but music is never 
relevant: it is always unnecessary and does not advance either of the two 
goals of VIS.  Presenting background music with relevant pictures or 
videos does not make the music relevant.  In fact, introducing evidence 
in a dramatic manner can even add irrelevant factors to otherwise 
relevant evidence.194  It is the actual testimony offered during VIS that 
describes the individual’s uniqueness and informs those listening of the 
harm done.  Even music that testimony shows is a favorite of the victim 
may not be relevant.195  In People v. Kelly, the victim’s mother testified 
that the background music for the video was chosen because it was the 
victim’s favorite.196  The court still found the music irrelevant, although 
not unduly prejudicial in that particular case.197  Courts conclude that 
background music is irrelevant time and time again, yet music is 
typically allowed when prosecutors introduce it along with relevant 
evidence. 
The Court in Payne suggested that evidence presented during the 
sentencing phase should be considered in light of the trial as a whole.198  
Although music should not initially be admitted, once it is admitted 
alongside relevant evidence, allowing prejudicial music is only a 
reversible error if it results in fundamentally unfair sentencing.  To 
decide the fairness of the trial as a whole, courts will consider what other 
evidence the jury has seen.  In Kelly, the court allowed an admittedly 
prejudicial videotape, explaining that “what this jury has heard from 
many other people makes this tape pale.”199  In Petruccelli v. State, the 
court reasoned the state’s strong evidence of appellant’s guilt allowed the 
jury to view a highly emotional tape.200  This rationale, however, only 
works when an appellate court is considering the fairness of an entire  
 
                                                     
 194. See People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571–72 (Cal. 2007) (finding that presenting a video in 
dramatic manner adds irrelevant factors), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 564 (2008). 
 195. Id. at 571. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 572. 
 198. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991). 
 199. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 568. 
 200. 184 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
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trial; it arguably does not fit within a trial court’s initial application of 
Payne’s limits on music. 
Payne held that evidence can only be admitted if it meets either 
purpose of VIS.201  A court cannot allow for leniency depending on the 
amount of evidence proving the defendant’s guilt.  It is up to the trial 
court’s broad discretion to decide whether to exclude evidence, yet it 
cannot be fair to allow emotional evidence in a strong case against a 
defendant when the same evidence would not be allowed in a weaker 
case.  In cases with less incriminating evidence, the VIS could be the 
deciding factor between life and death, and, as the dissent in Payne 
cautioned, prejudicial use of evidence in these cases is even more 
troubling.202 
 In reaching our decision today, however, we should not be 
concerned with the cases in which victim impact evidence will not 
make a difference.  We should be concerned instead with the cases in 
which it will make a difference.  In those cases, defendants will be 
sentenced arbitrarily to death on the basis of evidence that would not 
otherwise be admissible because it is irrelevant to the defendants’ 
moral culpability.  The Constitution’s proscription against the arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty must necessarily proscribe the 
admission of evidence that serves no purpose other than to result in 
such arbitrary sentences.203 
This discrepancy goes to the very heart of why courts need to 
consistently apply the Payne standard to prejudicial evidence and should 
no longer allow music during VIS.  Merely because courts can 
retroactively find the trial to be fundamentally fair does not mean music 
is not prejudicial.  Irrelevant and prejudicial music should not be 
admissible in the first place.  Without its admission, an analysis of the 
entire trial would not even be required. 
3. Balancing Interests 
Upon applying a common balancing test to weigh the interests of the 
prosecution and defendant, it is apparent that admission of music during 
VIS is unnecessary and unwarranted.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403’s balancing test provides that “evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
                                                     
 201. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 
 202. See Sullivan, supra note 41, at 630. 
 203. Payne, 501 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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prejudice.”204  Because this is similar to the standard in Payne, a 
comparable test to balance interests may be appropriate when deciding 
the admissibility of VIS.205  Music has no probative value: it provides no 
relevant information regarding the victim’s uniqueness or the harm 
caused that cannot be expressed through spoken testimony.  The danger 
of unfair prejudice, however, is high.206  Further, prohibiting the 
prosecution from presenting music during VIS places no burden on the 
government or the testifying victim.  Barring background music does not 
deprive the testimony of any substance and the rule is easy to enforce, as 
it merely requires pressing the mute button.207 
4. Reason for Creation 
Other courts have looked to the reason why the tape was prepared—
whether specifically for trial or for a memorial service.  Videos and 
music prepared initially for a tribute to the victim are predictably more 
sentimental than those put together for evidentiary purposes, and the 
prejudice of such evidence will outweigh any probative value.  As the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declared in Salazar v. State, “the 
punishment phase of a criminal trial is not a memorial service for the 
victim.  What may be entirely appropriate eulogies to celebrate the life 
and accomplishments of a unique individual are not necessarily 
admissible in a criminal trial.”208  Tapes prepared for memorial services 
typically include background music; tapes prepared specifically for 
                                                     
 204. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 205. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (balancing private interest and value of 
safeguards against governmental interest plus the burden of the procedural safeguards); see also 
Mark Stevens, Victim Impact Statements Considered in Sentencing: Constitutional Concerns, 2 CAL. 
CRIM. L. REV. 3 ¶48 (2000). 
 206. See Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 567 n.3 (2008) (“‘I cannot help but wonder if 
Payne . . . would have been decided the same way if the Supreme Court Justices in the majority had 
ever sat as trial judges in a federal death penalty case and had observed first hand, rather than 
through review of a cold record, the unsurpassed emotional power of victim impact testimony on a 
jury.  It has now been over four months since I heard this testimony [in a codefendant’s case] and the 
juror’s sobbing during the victim impact testimony still rings in the ears.  This is true even though 
the federal prosecutors in [the case] used admirable restraint in terms of the scope, amount, and 
length of victim impact testimony.’” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1107 
(N.D. Iowa 2005))). 
 207. See People v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105, 136 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he trial court excluded the 
videotape’s audio portion—including music—finding it to be unduly prejudicial and 
inappropriate.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 567 (2008). 
 208. Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 335–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  See also United States v. 
Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 192 n.12 (D. Mass. 2004) (“[T]he tape was made as a memorial 
tribute to [the victim] rather than produced for the purpose of this case.  It was fitting and lovely for 
its original, intended purpose, but not appropriate for presentation to the jury . . . .”). 
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evidentiary purposes will most likely not.  If music cannot be added for 
effect in other evidentiary exhibits, then a tape made for a memorial 
should not justify music’s inclusion—especially when it would be simple 
to mute the sound. 
5. Ability to Supplement Other Testimony 
Courts have admitted emotional and even musical evidence as long 
as it supplements or adds to other testimony regarding the victim or the 
harm.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Whittlesey v. State admitted 
a short video of the victim playing piano, a skill for which the victim was 
nationally known.209  In State v. Leon, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
admitted a video involving music that illustrated the victim at Christmas 
with her children.210  The court reasoned that admission of the tape was 
warranted because it illustrated prior testimony of the impact on the 
children, who were too young to present testimony to the court.211  
Similarly, in People v. Prince, the California Supreme Court admitted a 
videotaped interview of the victim discussing her interests in singing and 
acting, which supplemented other testimony regarding her interests.212  
The court did, however, exclude parts showing the victim actually 
performing, finding those portions to be cumulative.213  Even highly 
emotional evidence that supplements other testimony can be allowed as 
long as the probative value outweighs the potential prejudice.214  This 
rationale, however, still does not provide a valid reason for admitting 
music in VIS, as background music in picture montages does not add to 
or supplement the photos in any relevant way. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Advancing technology has opened the doors for prosecutors to bring 
in background music during VIS.  Although the rules regarding 
admissibility vary throughout jurisdictions, courts must apply Payne’s 
test to decide whether evidence in VIS is so unduly prejudicial that the 
result is fundamentally unfair.  The majority of courts allowing VIS to 
include music have been wrongly applying Payne’s test and 
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underestimating music’s effect on emotion.  At the very least, music has 
a prejudicial effect on emotion; other studies suggest that music even 
causes emotion.  Studies done with mock-juries show that emotions 
affect decision-making.  This means that using music during VIS is, by 
definition, undoubtedly prejudicial—it provides a tendency for jurors to 
make a decision based on something other than reason.215  The 
persuasive relationship between music and emotion establishes a high 
risk of prejudice and leaves no way to confirm whether a decision was 
reached through reason or emotion.  This is enough to render the 
sentencing fundamentally unfair. 
VIS are some of the most compelling evidence available to the 
prosecutor—they come directly from the hearts and mouths of survivors 
left behind.  Because VIS are the most emotional parts of a sentencing, 
adding unnecessary and irrelevant music to VIS does nothing but add 
another prejudicial and emotional factor to the jurors’ decision.  By 
applying other factors that courts have considered relevant when 
deciding the admission of evidence, it is apparent that music should not 
be admitted.  Background music does not have any probative value, as it 
does not provide any necessary or relevant information to the jury that is 
not gained through spoken testimony or pictures.  As many courts readily 
admit, music is also irrelevant.  Although courts have been unwilling to 
find the sentencing fundamentally unfair because of irrelevant music, this 
rationale does not follow Payne’s test, which would not allow the music 
in the first place.  After balancing the possible prejudice and probative 
value of music, it is evident that the lack of any probative value is 
outweighed by the grave danger of prejudice.  Background music in 
evidence that was not created for evidentiary purposes does not need to 
be included and it is easy to take out.  Finally, even if in some cases 
music may supplement or add to other relevant testimony, the 
background music that is the subject of this Comment does not.  
Allowing music during VIS causes prejudicial emotional decisions 
resulting in a fundamentally unfair sentencing and from this point on, 
courts must no longer allow music during VIS. 
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